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CORPORATE INSOLVENCY: SEPARATE LEGAL 
PERSONALITY AND DIRECTORS' 
DUTIES TO CREDITORS 
by MOHAMMAD RIZAL SALIM* 
Introduction 
The primary purpose for the doctrine of separate legal personality is to encourage 
entrepreneurship, by shifting the risks of business failure away from entrepreneurs to 
creditors and other risk bearers. Unfortunately this doctrine is subject to abuse by 
corporate controllers, which prompted the courts and the legislature to provide for 
exceptions. These exceptions are better known as the lifting or piercing of the 
corporate veil. How do these exceptions protect creditors? How effective are they? 
This article seeks to examine laws in relation to the separate legal personality 
doctrine and the duties of directors which directly affects, or attempts to protect, 
creditors from unfair and improper conduct by corporate controllers. 
The Legal Personality Doctrine 
Company as a separate legal personality 
It is a fundamental feature of company law that a company is a separate entity, 
distinct from its shareholders. The starting point for the discussion of this doctrine is 
the House of Lord's decision more than a hundred years ago in Salomon v Salomon & 
Co Ltd.1 It follows that since the company is a legal person separate from its' share-
holders, the shareholders will not be liable for the company's debts. Consequently, 
the course of action for the company's creditors is limited only to the company itself, 
and not its shareholders or even directors. A related doctrine is the doctrine of limited 
liability. 
Limited liability 
Limited liability means that the liability of shareholders is limited to the amount 
unpaid on their shares.2 Limited liability results in the shifting of the risks of 
* Lecturer in Law, Faculty of Law, Universiti Teknologi MARA, Malaysia, LLM (Melbourne), LLB (Hons) 
(Malaya), Advocate & Solicitor, High Court of Malaya. 
This article is based on a research project entitled 'Corporate Insolvency: The Protection of Creditors' 
Interests', funded by the Bureau of Research and Consultancy, Universiti Teknologi MARA. This article is the 
first of two parts. Part 2 will appear in the next edition of this journal. The author thanks the Bureau of Research 
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1 [1897] AC 22. 
2 The Companies Act 1965, s214(l)(d). 
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entrepreneurship from shareholders to creditors. If the company does well, the gains 
are passed on to the shareholders. But if the company fails, the creditors will suffer 
the losses. Because the creditors bear the risk of the company failing, creditors will, 
quite naturally, attempt to minimise the risk of default. Prudent creditors will always 
ascertain the creditworthiness of the debtor companies. The more sophisticated 
creditors such as financial institutions will, in addition to satisfying themselves that 
the debtor company is creditworthy, require the company to provide security, or 
require the company's shareholders or directors to provide personal guarantees. They 
may even go to such lengths as to require the company to provide its financial 
statements on a periodical basis, overseeing management, or placing their nominees 
in the board of the company. In addition, any extra risk which lenders bear will be 
compensated with higher rates of return for them. 
Thus, the separate legal personality and limited liability doctrines do not necessarily 
result in the transfer of risks from shareholders to creditors. Despite this, there exist 
no acceptable alternatives at the moment.3 
The separate legal personality and limited liability doctrines have been incorporated 
into the Malaysian Companies Act 1965.4 
Lifting of the veil of incorporation 
In certain circumstances, the courts may disregard the doctrines of separate legal 
personality and limited liability. This is known as the lifting or piercing of the veil of 
incorporation. There are no clear categorisations as to when the court will lift the 
corporate veil, but cases suggest that it could be done when the company is insolvent 
and there is fraud, deception or attempts to avoid a legal duty by the shareholders or 
directors, to the detriment of present or future creditors of the company. 
The case of Salomon v Salomon & Co5 provides a good illustration, where the House 
of Lords said that in the absence of fraud, the court would adhere to the separate legal 
personality doctrine. Fraud as a ground for lifting the corporate veil is now firmly 
established. In Re Darby,6 for example, the court found that the promoter had 
committed fraud sufficient to lift the veil of incorporation. 
Apart from fraud, the courts have also lifted the veil of incorporation in cases where 
the veil was used in an attempt to evade legal obligations. In Gilford Motor Company 
v Home,1 an ex-employee incorporated a company to avoid his obligation under a 
contract with his former employer. In Jones v Lipman1, the seller of a house 
3 Although there may be the occasional suggestions for reform, especially in areas where corporate groups are 
concerned: see P Blumberg, The Multinational Challenge to Corporate Law (1993) at 121-147; T Hadden, "The 
Regulation for Corporate Groups in Australia" (1992) 15 UNSWLJ 61 at 81-85. 
4 Section 16(5). See also ss 214(l)(d) and 18(3) of the Act which provide for limited liability of shareholders. 
5 Note 1. 
6 [1911] 1KB 95. 
7 [1933] Ch 935. 
8 [1962] 1 WLR 832. 
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incorporated a company to evade his obligations under a sale agreement. The 
decision in both cases were approved by the Supreme Court in Lim KarBeevDuofortis 
Property (M) Sdn Bhd9 where Peh Swee Chin SCJ said that the court will lift the 
corporate veil to discover an illegal or improper purpose. 
Implicit in these cases were attempts by the courts to ignore the separate legal 
personality doctrine and to lift the corporate veil where the incorporation process was 
improperly used to benefit its incorporator at the expense of creditors. In other words, 
incorporation was used to defeat future claims. In Re Darby,10 incorporation was 
used to defeat possible claims by the company's shareholders against Darby as the 
real promoter of Quarries. Similarly, in Gilford Motor Company v Horne,n the 
ex-employee attempted to evade contractual obligations by using the company to do 
the act which he was otherwise prevented from doing by contract. In Jones v Lipman,'2 
the seller of the property transferred the property to a company in his attempt to 
defeat a claim by the buyer of the property. The claimants in all of these cases were 
either creditors or future creditors of the incorporators. 
There had been occasions where the incorporation process itself was not intended to 
defeat the claims of creditors, but the courts declined to uphold to the strict 
application of the separate legal personality doctrine, as by so doing it will prevent 
the incorporators from satisfying creditors' claims. An example is the case of Aspatra 
Sdn Bhd v Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhdn where the Malaysian Supreme Court by 
a majority decided that it is proper to lift the corporate veil as the majority 
shareholder held almost all shares in several companies and was regarded to be the 
alter ego of the companies. The court had considered the interests of the creditors, in 
this case the banks, in ordering that the veil of incorporation be lifted. This was 
necessary to achieve justice. 
Another example is Hotel Jaya Puri Bhd v National Union of Hotel, Bar and 
Restaurant Workers}A The court in this case had departed from the separate legal 
personality doctrine to give effect to the claims of the employees of a company for 
unlawful dismissal. The court looked at the reality that both a holding and its 
subsidiary companies as being in one enterprise because the businesses of both the 
holding and subsidiary companies were interdependent and that there was 'functional 
integrity and unity of establishment' between them. Therefore the court found it 
reasonable to ignore the separate legal doctrine principle to give effect to claims by 
the employees of the subsidiary to enable them to sue the holding company. 
9 [1992] 2 M U 281. 
10 Note 6. 
11 Note 7. 
12 Note 8. 
13 [1988] 1MLJ97. 
14 [1980] 1 MLJ 109 
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There are numerous other examples. In Creasy v Breachwood Motors Ltd[S, the 
company was used to avoid a payment owed to a manager fired by the company. In 
Re A Company Ltd16 the companies were used to conceal and dispose off money 
obtained through fraud. In Wallesteiner v Moir," the court lifted the corporate veil 
because of the misuse of corporate funds by a shareholder.18 
The creditors' rights argument in lifting the veil was perhaps one of the reasons for 
the enactment of the wrongful and fraudulent trading provisions in the Companies 
Act 1965." When the persons running the company are involved in wrongful or 
fraudulent trading, the courts will pierce the corporate veil and impose personal 
liabilities on them to make good the losses due to the creditors, in addition to impos-
ing criminal liabilities.20 
Obviously, the legislature through the wrongful and fraudulent trading 
provisions, had deemed it necessary to give effect to creditors' rights where the 
company is insolvent. Why is it then necessary for the courts to pierce the corporate 
veil to give effect to creditors' rights when the legislation provides for the same 
protection? One obvious reason is the limitations of the wrongful and fraudulent 
trading provisions. These will be discussed later in this article. Another reason is that 
the wrongful and fraudulent trading provisions require a detailed analysis of each 
alleged wrongful act.21 By contrast, the courts need not be satisfied of the wrongful or 
fraudulent nature of a particular act before it will pierce the corporate veil; the 
elements to be fulfilled are "more general and more vague".22 This analysis may be 
accurate when analysing the approach taken by the courts in certain cases.23 
Tung's analysis, notwithstanding that he used United States' cases for support, should 
be equally relevant here in Malaysia. The courts have always been willing to pierce 
the corporate veil in order to do justice. The attempt to uphold justice, as the cases 
discussed above had shown, includes justice to creditors, current or future. Cases in 
which the courts had expressed their willingness to lift the corporate veil to achieve 
15 (1993) BCLC 480. 
16 [1985] BCLC 333. 
17 [1974] 2 All ER 217. 
18 For other cases where the court had lifted the corporate veil, see, eg, Tiu Shi Kian v Red Rose Restaurant Sdn 
Bhd [ 1984] 2 MLJ 313; Hoffman-La Roche ACoAGv Sieczko [1968] RPC 460; (incorporation to evade a court 
order); Hotel Jaya Puri Bhd v National Union of Hotel, Bar & Restaurant Workers [1980] 1 MLJ 109; DHN 
Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [ 1976] 3 All ER 462 (in relation to group of 
companies); Aspatra Sdn Bhd v Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd [1988] 1 MLJ 97; Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd v 
Birmingham Corporation [1939] 4 All ER 116 (company alter ego its incorporators); Tan Guan Eng v Ng 
Kweng Hee [1992] 1 MLJ 487 (to enforce members' rights); Re FG (Films) Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 483; Re Bugle 
Press Ltd [1961] Ch 270 (company a sham). 
19 Companies Act 1965, ss 303(3) and 304(1) respectively. 
20 Companies Act 1965, ss 304(2) and (5). 
21 Described as a 'rifle shot' approach by Frederick Tung, "Fiduciary Duty, Limited Liability, and the Law of 
Delaware: Limited Liability and Creditors' Rights; The Limits of Risk Shifting to Creditors" 34 Ga L Rev 547 
(2000) at 567. 
22 Described by Tung as the 'shotgun approach': see Tung, ibid at 568. 
23 Tung cites the case of De Witt Truck Brothers lnc v W Ray Flemming Fruit Co 540 F 2d 681 (4th Cir 1976), 
where the dominant shareholder of a company regularly took money belonging to the company for his personal 
use: see Tung, ibid at 565-566. 
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justice include Hotel Jaya Puri v National Union of Hotel, Bar and Restaurant 
Workers,M Aspatra Sdn Bhd v Bank Bumiputra Sdn Bhd,2i Tengku Abdullah ibni Sul-
tan Abu Bakar v Mohd Latiffbin Shah Mohd26 and Tan Guan Eng v Ng Kweng Hee.21 
The Duties Of Directors 
"Bona fide for the benefit of the company" 
Directors are under a duty to act "bona fide in the interests of the company as a 
whole".28 Following Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd,29 the natural meaning ascribed to 
the phrase is the company as a corporate entity, an abstract entity with powers and 
liabilities; a creation of statute. Following Percival v Wright,30 the duties are owed to 
the company alone and not to individual shareholders or persons dealing with the 
company such as creditors. In Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas?^ interests of the 
company were held to mean the corporators as a general body, i.e. the shareholders 
collectively. Interests of shareholders are generally accepted as the existing 
shareholders, but may include future shareholders, as shareholders interests means 
not only interests in the short term but also interests in the long term: Provident 
International Corporation v International Leasing Corp.22 
These pronouncements, however, do not mean that directors owe a duty to 
shareholders; the duty is owed to the company, but in acting in the interests of the 
company, the directors must consider the interests of shareholders. The Jenkins 
Committee in England said, when commenting on the effect of Percival v Wright,22, 
that "no fiduciary duty is owed by a director to individual members of his company, 
but only to the company itself, and a fortiori that none is owed to a person who is not 
a member".34 
Although directors owe no direct fiduciary duties to shareholders, the 
Companies Act 1965 provides remedies for shareholders for oppression or unfair 
conduct.35 
24 Note 14. 
25 Note 13. 
26 [1996] 2 MLJ 265; [1996] 2 AMR 2633 
27 [1992] 1MU 487. 
28 Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd [ 1900] 1 Ch 656, per Lord Lindley MR at 671. See also Re Smith & 
Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304, per Lord Greene MR at 306; Greenhalgh v Ardene Cinemas [1951] Ch 286, per 
EvershedMRat291. 
29 Note 1. 
30 (1902) 2 Ch 421. 
31 [1951] Ch 286, per Lord Evershed MR at 291. See also Ngurli v McCann (1953) 90CLR 425 at 438. 
32 [ 1969] 1 NS WLR 424 per Helsham J at 440. 
33 Note 30. 
34 Report on the Committee of Company Law Reform Cmnd 1749 (1962), para 89. 
35 Section 181 of the Companies Act 1965. For equivalent provisions in the UK, sees 459 of the 1985 Companies 
Act and in Australia, s 260 of the Corporations Law. 
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Directors' duties to creditors 
The phrase "interests of the company" has undergone significant development. In 
recent years, the phrase was thought to import some considerations of the interests of 
other stakeholders, including the company's creditor.36 One of the early cases that 
expanded the scope of the 'interest of the company' is Teck Corporation Ltdv Millar31 
a decision of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, where Berger J suggested that 
the phrase br expanded to include the interests of employees and the community. 
While it was said that consideration of these "external" interests were merely 
permissible and not an obligation on the part of the directors, the Australian High 
Court decision in Walker v Wimbornen put a positive obligation on directors to have 
regard to the interests of creditors. 
Commentators argue that having regard to creditors' interests does not 
necessarily mean that the directors owe a duty to creditors. This is because the notion 
of directors' duties to creditors is inconsistent with the doctrine of separate legal 
personality. Furthermore, the relationship between the company and creditors is purely 
contractual, and there is no basis for finding that directors owe any duties, fiduciary 
or otherwise, toward the creditors. In addition, even if a duty can be said to exist, 
there are no remedies that the creditors may obtain.39 
Courts in the United Kingdom have repeatedly rejected any notion of directors' 
duties to creditors: see, for example Re Halt Garage (1964) Ltd,40 Re Horsley & 
Weight Ltd,4[ Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd42 and 
Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co Ltd v Multinational Gas and 
Petrochemical Services Ltd.42 
Walker v Wimborne44 was however affirmed by later decisions although there were 
conflicting views on the nature of the duty. On the one hand, there is a line of cases 
which held that directors owe a duty to creditors. Another line of cases declares that 
directors' duties are owed to the company, but in exercising their duty, they must take 
into account the interests of creditors. These two groups of cases will be examined 
separately. 
36 Other interests include the interests of employees, customers, contractors, suppliers, the environment and the 
community. 
37 (1973) 33 DLR (3d) 288. 
38 (1976) 137 CLR 1. 
39 As Professor Sealy pointed out in one of his many commentaries: "A supposed legal duty which is not matched 
by a remedy is a nonsense": see LS Sealy, "Directors' Wider Responsibilities - Problems Conceptual, Practical 
and Procedural" (1987) 13 MULR 164 at 177. 
40 [1982] 3 All ER 1016. 
41 [1982] 3 All ER 1045. 
42 [1991] 1 AC 187; [1990] 3 All ER 404. 
43 [1983] Ch 258; [1983] 2AUER 563. 
44 Note 38. 
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Directors owe a duty to creditors 
Ring v Sutton,4S Winkworth v Edward Baron Development Co Ltd46 and Jeffree v 
National Companies and Securities Commission41 are examples where the courts have 
held that directors owe a duty to creditors.48 Ring v Sutton49 is a decision of the New 
South Wales Supreme Court where the court held that the directors of a company 
breached their duties and disregarded the interests of creditors when they caused the 
company to lend money at below market rates.50 Walker v Wimborne5[ was cited as an 
authority that directors' owe a duty to creditors. In Winkworth v Edward Baron 
Development Co Ltd52 the House of Lords took a view similar to Ring v Sutton.53 
Lord Templeman said that "a duty is owed to the company and to the creditors of the 
company to ensure that the affairs of the company are properly administered and that 
its property is not dissipated or exploited for the benefit of the directors themselves to 
the prejudice of the creditors".54 This was approved in Jeffree v National Companies 
and Securities Commission.55 
Lord Templeman J's statement is, however, ambiguous. First, he said that directors of 
a company owe a duty to both the company and its creditors. He preceded this 
statement with another statement that a company owes a duty to the creditors. How 
did the duty arise? The relationship between a company and its creditors is no more 
than a relationship between a debtor and a creditor, which is based on contract. A 
debtor which is not a company will not normally be imposed of any duty other than 
that which were imposed upon him under the contract; why would it be different 
where the debtor is a company? There is no legal basis for imposing any additional 
duties to the debtor company or its directors. One writer had commented that Lord 
Templeman J's suggestion that the company owes a duty to its creditors is "a novel 
suggestion in that it implies some sort of obligation owed by the company to its 
creditors over and above any contractual obligations incurred by the company in its 
dealings with its creditors".56 
Secondly, the court did not specify the nature of the duty - is it simply a duty of good 
faith or a fiduciary duty? It is unlikely that fiduciary duties will be imposed on 
directors to creditors - creditors are expected to, and are normally in a position to 
protect their own interests through bargaining and contract. There is generally no 
45 (1979)5ACLR. 546. 
46 [1987] 1 All ER 114. 
47 (1989)7ACLC556. 
48 For a different view, see cases cited at nn 61-66. 
49 Note 45. 
50 This case was curious for two reasons - one, Mason J in Walker v Wimborne. note 38, merely said that directors 
must consider the interests of creditors. This has to be distinguished with a direct duty to creditors. Secondly, in 
this case, the company was solvent at the time when the loan was made. 
51 Note 38. 
52 Note 46. 
53 Note 45. 
54 Note 46 at 118. 
55 Note 47. But see L Sealy, "Directors 'Wider' Responsibilities - Problems Conceptual, Practical and Proce-
dural" (1987) 13 MULR 164, where he opined that this case was 'probably wrong on its reported facts'. 
56 See CA Riley "Directors' duties and the interests of creditors" (1989) 10 Company Lawyer 87. 
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element of trust between directors and creditors and no corresponding vulnerability 
on the part of the creditors resulting from the trust.57 Thus it is unlikely that the duties 
be categorised as fiduciary. 
Thirdly, the issue of enforcement for breach of duty. Riley asked the question whether 
"the duty ought to be owed to creditors, and enforceable by them".58 If a breach of 
such duty is directly enforceable by the creditors, it will 'invite multiplicity of 
actions, encourage litigation and incur considerable time and expense'.59 This should 
be compared with rights of creditors to bring an action under sections 303 and 304 
Companies Act 1965 whereby the creditors are given statutory rights to commence 
proceedings against directors for "wrongful trading" and "fraudulent trading". These 
provisions will be discussed in Part 2 of this article. 
Fourthly, on what basis would the duties be imposed on the directors? Directors owe 
fiduciary duties to the company because they are the agents of the company, and they 
have the power to act in a way which could be detrimental to the company. Directors 
must also act in the interests of the shareholders because it is the shareholders who 
elect them to office, and the acts of the directors will ultimately affect the 
shareholders, who are the residual claimants of the assets of the company. If they do 
their job well and the company prospers, shareholders can expect good returns on 
their investment through the payment of dividends and the increased value of their 
shares. On the other hand, if the directors fail in the performance of their duties, the 
company will also fail, and the shareholders will get no return on their investment. 
Upon winding up, after the claims of all the creditors had been satisfied, only then 
may the shareholders claim their share of the assets of the company, or whatever is 
left of it. This is why it has been said that shareholders are the residual owners of the 
company. The claims by creditors, on the other hand, are fixed. They have no 
involvement in the company's affairs, and no power to appoint the directors. Their 
rights are purely based on contract, and upon winding up they will be entitled to 
payment in preference to the residual claimants, i.e. the shareholders.60 Thus, 
imposing fiduciary or other related duties upon directors to creditors is a theoretical 
and conceptual leap without valid justification to support the creation of such a duty. 
Directors owe a duty to the company but must also take into account the inter-
ests of creditors 
It has been pronounced, through an overwhelming majority of cases, that 
directors do not owe any direct duty to creditors. The duties are owed primarily to the 
57 The prerequisites for the imposition of fiduciary duties here are derived from the classical statement by Fletcher 
Moulton LJ in Re Coomber [1911] 1 Ch 723 at 728-729. For a local version of this proposition, see Tengku 
Abdullah ibni Sultan Abu Bakar v Mohd Latiffbin Shah Mohd [1996] 2 AMR 2633, per Gopal Sri Ram JCA at 
2672-2673. See also PD Finn, "Contract and Fiduciary Principle" (1989) 12 UNSWLJ 76; JM Gill, "A Man 
Cannot Serve Two Masters: The Nature, Existence and Scope of Fiduciary Duties" (1989) Journal of Contract 
Law 115; BH McPherson J, "Fiduciaries; Who Are They?" (1998) ALJ 288. 
58 Riley, n 56. 
59 Riley, ibid, at 92. 
60 See Andrew D Shaffer, "Corporate Fiduciary - Insolvent: The Fiduciary Relationship Your Corporate Law 
Professor (Should Have) Warned You About" (2000) 8 Am Bankr Inst L Rev 479. 
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company. However, in acting for the company, they must have regard to the interests 
of the creditors. This is the opinion of the courts in several cases which include 
Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd (in liq),6[ Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd (in 
liq),620 Brady v Brady6i, West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v Dodd,M Facia Footwear Ltd 
(in administration) v Hinchliffe,6S and Yukong Line Ltd of Korea v Rendsburg Invest-
ments Corp of Liberia (No 2)66. 
In Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd (in liq),61 the company ran into liquidity 
problems, and the directors adopted a restructuring scheme, which was approved by 
the shareholders. However, the creditors of the company opposed the scheme as 
being prejudicial to their interests. The company was later placed in liquidation, and 
the liquidators sought to recover money paid to the shareholders as capital dividends, 
by commencing an action against the directors. The liquidators argued that the 
payment of dividends was made in breach of the directors' duties as the company was 
in a state of near insolvency at that time. In paying the dividends, the directors had 
neglected the interests of existing and future creditors. All three judges rejected this 
argument as the company was solvent at the time of restructuring and 
therefore no issue of directors' duties to creditors would arise. In addition, the 
directors' had, when implementing the scheme, acted in the best interests of the 
company. Furthermore, they had acted honestly, and the purpose of the scheme was 
not to remove the assets from the reach of the creditors. One of the judges, Cooke J, 
having studied and analyzed the law relating to directors' duties to creditors, offered 
his view:68 
The duties of directors are owed to the company. On the facts of particular 
cases this may require, inter alia, the interests of creditors. For instance, 
creditors are entitled to consideration, in my opinion, if the company is 
insolvent, or near insolvent, or of doubtful solvency, or if a contemplated 
payment or other course of action would jeopardise its solvency... 
In Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd (in liq),69 the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales approved the statements of Cooke J in Nicholson v Permakraft.10 Street CJ 
said:71 
61 [1985] 1 NZLR 242, (1985) 3 ACLC 453. 
62 (1986) 10 ACLC 395. 
63 (1988)BCLC20. 
64 [1988] BCLC 250. 
65 [1998] 1 BCLC 218. 
66 [1998] 4 All ER 82, although in this case the company controller was held liable for breach of duty not under the 
common law, but under s 212 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
67 Note 61. 
68 Ibid at 249. 
69 Note 62. 
70 Note 61. 
71 Note 62, at 40 land 404. 
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The learned judge in the first instance held, as I have noted, that he was bound 
by authority to hold that the approval by all of the shareholders validated an 
action which would otherwise be beyond the powers of the directors provided 
that there had been a full and frank disclosure to the shareholders of all the 
circumstances relevant to the proposed transaction ... 
The authorities to which his Honour submitted, notwithstanding the generality 
of their enunciations of principle, were not intended to, and do not, apply in a 
situation in which the interests of the company as a whole involve the rights of 
creditors as distinct from the rights of shareholders. In a solvent company the 
proprietary interests of the shareholders entitle them as a general body to be 
regarded as the company when questions of the duty of directors arise. If, as a 
general body, they authorise or ratify a particular action of the directors, there 
can be no challenge to the validity of what the directors have done. But where 
a company is insolvent the interests of the creditors intrude. They become 
prospectively entitled, through the mechanism of liquidation, to displace the 
power of the shareholders and directors to deal with the company's assets. It is 
in a practical sense their assets and not the shareholders' assets that, through 
the medium of the company, are under the management of the directors 
pending either liquidation, return to solvency, or the imposition of some 
alternative administration... 
It is, to my mind, legally and logically acceptable to recognise that, where 
directors are involved in a breach of their duty to the company affecting the 
interests of shareholders, then shareholders can either authorise that breach in 
prospect or ratify it in retrospect. Where, however, the interests at risk are those 
of creditors I see no reason in law or in logic to recognise that the shareholders 
can authorise the breach. Once it is accepted, as in my view it must be, that the 
directors' duty to a company as a whole extends in an insolvency context to not 
prejudicing the interests of creditors ... the shareholders do not have the power 
or authority to absolve the directors from that breach. 
Nourse LJ of the English Court of Appeal expressed similar sentiments in Brady v 
Brady:12 
In a case where the assets are enormous and the debts minimal it is reasonable 
to suppose that the interests of the creditors ought not to count for very much. 
Conversely, where the company is insolvent, or even doubtfully solvent, the 
interests of the company are in reality the interests of the existing creditors 
alone. 
This approach has gained further acceptance in later decisions: WestMercia Safetywear 
Ltd v Dodd,n Facia Footwear Ltd (in administration) v Hinchcliffe™ and Yukong 
Line of Korea v Rendsburg Investment Corp of Liberia (No 2).1S 
72 Note 63 at 40. 
73 Note 64. 
74 Note 65. 
75 Note 66. 
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Thus, it is now quite settled that directors owe a duty to the company, but where the 
company is insolvent, they must have regard to the interests of creditors. However, 
this approach is also riddled with difficulties. First, even when the company is 
insolvent, how are the creditors to enforce their rights when the directors had disre-
garded their interests as creditors? Pursuant to the rule in Foss v Harbottle,16 since the 
duty is owed to the company and not to the creditors directly, the damage suffered 
was the company's, and not the creditors'. Consequently, only the company will be 
entitled to take action against the errant directors.77 Even where a liquidator has been 
appointed, any action taken by the liquidator will be on behalf of the company and 
not the creditors. 
Secondly, the issue of ratification. It is generally accepted that those to whom the 
duties are owed may release those who owe the duties from legal obligation.78 
Although technically shareholders are not the beneficiaries to whom directors owe 
their duties, they are recognised to be the residual owners of the company and as such 
they are empowered to ratify any breach of directors' duty. Two issues arise here. If 
the directors of an insolvent company had breached their duty to the company by not 
acting in the interests of the company, can the shareholders ratify this breach of duty? 
Although no direct authority can be found on this, the answer would probably be 
negative. As Street CJ said in Kinsela,19 when the company is insolvent, the 
shareholders no longer have an interest in the company and the creditors become 
prospectively entitled to displace the power of the shareholders. Therefore, 
shareholders are no longer entitled to ratify any breach of duty. This poses a further 
question: where a company is clearly insolvent, can the creditors ratify a director's 
breach of duty instead? Applying the residual owners theory, the answer is probably 
negative. Unlike shareholders, creditors are not the residual owners of a company; 
their rights are still based on contract notwithstanding that the company had become 
insolvent. 
Thirdly, when would the duty arise? Ignoring for the moment the line of cases 
requiring consideration being given to the interests of creditors despite the company 
being solvent,80 the event which would trigger the creation of the duty to creditors 
would be the insolvency of the company. What is then, the test of insolvency? The 
courts generally offer no guidance, although Cooke J in Nicholson v Permakraf?x did 
mention a balance sheet solvency and the ability to pay capital dividend as a form of 
assessment. Cooke J went on to say that creditors are entitled to consideration not 
only when the company is insolvent, or near insolvent, or of doubtful solvency, or if 
a contemplated payment or course of action would jeopardise its solvency. But then 
76 67 ER 189. 
77 For a general discussion of this rule, see Mohammad Rizal Salim, "The Shareholders' Derivative Action" [2000] 
1 M U xliv. 
78 PL Davis, Gower 's Principles of Modern Company Law (Sweet & Maxwell London 6th Ed 1997) 644-645. 
79 Note 62. 
80 Ring v Sutton, n 45 and Winkworth, n 46. See also Razeen Sappideen, "Fiduciary Obligations to Corporate 
Creditors" (1991) JBL 365, where the author examines research done by financial theorists and argues for the 
need to recognise creditor interests as being at par as shareholders interests in a solvent company. 
81 Note 61. 
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again, how would the directors determine that the company is near insolvent or in a 
situation of doubtful solvency? Should the courts formulate a test for this? It is 
extremely important for directors to know exactly (if this is possible) when the 
company turns from being solvent to near insolvent or doubtful solvency as then they 
could put their mind to managing the company in such a way so as to protect the 
interests of creditors rather than that of the shareholders.82 
In addition, it is to be expected that directors will from time to time make risky 
business decisions. As long as there is no wrongdoing on the part of the directors, 
they are entitled to do just that. In fact, the very basis for the doctrine of separate legal 
personality is to transfer the risk of entrepreneurship to creditors. Risk is very much a 
part of any business, and directors often take great risks in anticipation of greater 
profits for the company. Nonetheless, simply by taking risky business decisions, 
directors may be construed to engage in a course of action which may jeopardise a 
company's solvency. If this is a test of insolvency, as proposed by Cooke J in Nicholson 
v Permakraft,83 then every company is in the state of insolvency. Therefore, directors 
will be obliged to consider the interests of creditors even when the company is 
solvent. The problem with this is that it is not easy to harmonise the interests of 
creditors and shareholders. Their interests often conflict. Shareholders seek to 
maximise the returns to their investment, and may be willing to take great risks in 
order to achieve greater returns. In taking these business risks, the shareholders will 
take comfort in knowing that if these investment decisions prove to be wrong, their 
losses will be limited to what they have promised to pay the company for their shares. 
The claims of creditors, on the other hand, are fixed under the contract. They will not 
get anything more than what is due to them even where the company is hugely prof-
itable. However, where the company fails, they may not get paid at all. Thus, credi-
tors would prefer that directors remain prudent in making business decisions, and not 
take gambles although it may reap large returns to shareholders. Because of the 
conflict between these two factions, requiring directors to take into account of the 
interests of both shareholders and creditors at the same time will be impractical. 
A similar conflict arose in the United States. The facts in Credit Lyonnais Bank 
Nederland, NV v Pathe Communications** were complicated, but essentially, the 
directors of MGM, a troubled motion picture company, had ceded operating control 
of the company to nominees of Credit Lyonnais Bank, MGM's substantial creditor. 
The majority shareholder of MGM sought to make the company sell some assets 
belonging to the company to repay its debts to Credit Lyonnais and thereafter 
re-claim control of the company. The nominees refused. In court, the majority 
shareholder claimed that the nominees had violated their duties to him.85 Chancellor 
William Allen dismissed the claim, saying: 
82 See Vanessa Finch, "Directors'duties towards creditors" (1989) 10 Company Lawyer 23. 
83 Note 61. 
84 Unreported, No 12150,1991 WL277613 (Delaware Chancery, 30 December 1991); available at LEXIS-NEXIS. 
85 It must be noted that in the United States it is commonly accepted that directors owe a direct duty to sharehold-
ers: see e.g. discussion by Andrew D. Shaffer. "Corporate Fiduciary - Insolvent: The Fiduciary Relationship 
Your Corporate Law Professor (Should Have) Warned You About" 8 Am Bankr Inst L Rev 479 (2000). 
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Where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of 
directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to 
the corporate enterprise ... [The corporate controllers] had an obligation to the 
community of interest that sustained the corporation, to exercise judgment in 
an informed, good faith effort to maximise the corporation's long-term wealth 
creating capacity. 
How the above statement relates to the duties of directors to creditors is not clear at 
all. Perhaps creditors are part of a corporate enterprise, and thus when the corporation 
is in the vicinity of insolvency the interests of various stakeholders of the corporation 
must be considered as well. In any case, the judge did set out, in the footnote of the 
statement quoted above, a hypothetical problem which sets out a conflict between 
shareholders and creditors' interest. 
Credit Lyonnais66 attracted a lot of comments and responses87 primarily because prior 
to the case, it was an established principle that directors owe no fiduciary duties to 
creditors.88 Apart from the much discussed issue of competing claims by 
shareholders and creditors, a point which had been noted above, commentators also 
question the meaning of the phrase "vicinity of insolvency". As was pointed out by 
one commentator, firms are always in the vicinity of insolvency because all it takes to 
become insolvent is to lose a sufficiently risky bet.89 
Credit Lyonnais90 must be read in the Malaysian context with caution because unlike 
the United States, directors owe a fiduciary duty to the company and not to the 
shareholders, unless there is a special circumstance which creates such a duty.91 Be-
cause of this, no fiduciary duties will be owed to creditors. The case is however useful 
to show that the difficulties in relation to directors' duties to creditors are not peculiar 
to us, but are universal. 
Tentative Conclusion 
The doctrine of separate legal personality is well established. It appears that the courts 
are willing to disregard the doctrine where creditors' interests are prejudiced as the 
result of improper behaviour by corporate controllers. More difficult questions arise 
on the issue of directors' duties to creditors. Directors are appointed by shareholders 
to manage the company for the benefit of the shareholders ultimately. Although the 
86 Note 84. 
87 See eg, CR Morris, "Directors' Duties in Nearly Insolvent Corporations: A Comment on Credit Lyonnais" 
(1993) 19 The Journal of Corporation Law 61, and the numerous articles cited in the footnote of the article. See 
also Shaffer, above; Tung, above; Ann Stilson, "Reexamining the Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate Insolvency 
and Dissolution: Defining Directors' Duties to Creditors" 20 Del J Corp L 1. 
88 In Kalz v Oak Industries Inc. 508 A. 2d 873 (Delaware Chancery 1986), the court said that the relationship 
between a corporation and its bondholders are governed based on the terms of the contract and the concept of 
fairness does not apply. 
89 TA Smith, "The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty" 98 Mich 
L Rev 214. 
90 Note 84. 
91 Eg, Coleman v Myers [1977] 2 NZLR 255. 
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duties are owed directly to the company and not to the shareholders, the interests of 
the shareholders must be taken into consideration, as it is ultimately for their benefit 
that the business of the company is being conducted. In other words, the shareholders 
form the primary corporate constituent of the company, the others being the creditors, 
employees, and the public at large. 
The company's obligation towards the creditors is primarily a contractual obligation. 
However, even while the company is a going concern, directors must consider the 
interests of the creditors, as a failure to do so will result in certain repercussions of 
which the most obvious will be a legal action being taken against the company, and 
the harm inflicted to the company's reputation and credit rating. While the interests of 
creditors are relevant, directors will be under no obligation to actively advance 
creditors interest.92 
Where the company is insolvent or near insolvent, the creditors will replace the 
shareholders as the primary corporate constituent.93 This is because the shareholders 
will no longer benefit from the company; but it is the creditors who will stand to lose 
or gain the most, depending on how the business of the company is conducted and its 
assets utilised. 
This (hopefully) explains the seemingly contradictory principles in the cases discussed 
above. Even in Winkworth,94 Lord Templeman said that the breaches of duty would 
not matter if the company were able to maintain its solvency, which it failed to do. 
Perhaps therefore, Lord Templeman's statement should be read in this way: in a 
solvent company, the duty is owed to the creditors, not directly, but as a part of 
corporate constituent of the company. Where the directors have disregarded the 
interests of creditors, and plunges into insolvency, creditors will be entitled to 
complain. To hold that directors of a solvent company owe no duty to creditors is to 
give a free licence to directors to act in such a way so as to defeat creditors' rights. A 
case in point is Jeffree,95 where the entire assets of a company was transferred to a 
new company formed with the same directors and shareholders, resulting in a creditor 
being denied of his claim against the first company. The Supreme Court of Western 
Australia held that this transaction was effected in breach of director's duties. 
However, either of these approaches (whether the duties is owed to the company or 
directly to creditors) poses different sets of difficulties: the enforcement of duties by 
creditors; ratification of breach of duties and the test for insolvency. The solution to 
these problems requires more than the piecemeal approach used by the courts to suit 
the circumstances of their particular case, but through a more comprehensive effort, 
which can only be provided through legislation. 
92 See R Grantham, "Directors' Duties and Insolvent Companies" (1991) 54 MLR 576. 
93 Ibid. 
94 ' Note 46. 
95 Note 47. 
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